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The Birth and Persistence of
the Katyn Lie
Witold Wasilewski*
As a result of the German invasion of Poland in September
1, 1939 and then the Soviet invasion on September 17, half of
Poland’s territory came under Soviet rule. In the spring of
1940, the Soviets murdered about 22,000 Polish officers—
including prisoners of war and high-profile citizens—in Katyn
and in other locations. After the German invasion of the Soviet
Union on April 13, 1943, Radio Berlin announced the discovery
of the bodies of Polish officers killed by Bolsheviks in the Katyn
region. On April 15, 1943 Radio Moscow published a
communiqué from the Soviet Information Bureau that blamed
the Germans for the massacre of Polish officers. This
communiqué gave birth to the false Soviet version of the murder
of Polish prisoners of war, which became known as the Katyn
lie. In the subsequent months the Katyn lie was reinforced by
fabricated “evidence” provided by the Soviet security
departments NKVD and NKGB. In early 1944, the Special State
Commission, headed by Nikolai Budenko, presented to the world
the complete official Soviet version of the atrocities against
Poles. After World War II, the Soviet fabrication was
perpetuated and spread to all countries of the communist bloc
and to many circles in the west. This article details the spread
of the Katyn lie, as uncovered through newly available
documents in official Russian historical archives.

*

Witold Wasilewski, PhD (Warsaw, Poland)—age 41, modern and
contemporary historian. Graduate of Faculty of History at University of
Warsaw with Master’s degree. In 2004, Wasilewski defended his doctoral
thesis on Polish-Russian relations at the turn of the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries. From 2001 to 2003, Wasilewski led didactic classes
at University of Warsaw for the students of history and sociology. Then,
from 2004 to 2007, Wasilewski gave lectures at Cardinal Stefan
Wyszynski University in Warsaw on history of Russia for the students
of history and history of culture. Currently, he is an employee of
Institute of National Remembrance, dedicated to the study of the issue
of Katyn massacre and lie. His other recent works include, among
others, the monograph The Bukowina Expedition of Stanislaw
Jablonowski in 1685 (2002) and Marian Zdziechowski in View of the
Russian Thought of XIX and XX Century (2005), and many scholarly
articles regarding the political history of Poland, Russia, and the world
in the twentieth century.
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I. Introduction
In the spring of 1940, pursuant to a March 5th order of the
Political Bureau of the VCP (b), the People’s Commissariat for
Internal Affairs (NKVD) murdered about 22,000 Polish prisoners of
war and other Polish citizens that had been arrested in the Polish
territories annexed to the Soviet Union.1 The victims were mainly
Polish military officers.2 The Katyn Forest was one the various
locations of their execution.
The truth about the Katyn massacre came from an unexpected
source. In the early spring of 1943, after information from the local
population and an informal investigation, German authorities decided
to search the Katyn Forest.3 The search led to the discovery of the
bodies of the murdered Polish officers, the last piece of evidence
linking the NKVD to the murders. After the defeat at Stalingrad,
Joseph Goebbels, interested in undermining the credibility of the
Soviet Union, began a propaganda offensive. On April 13, 1943, Radio
Berlin announced that German authorities discovered the bodies of
Polish officers in the Katyn Forest near Smolensk.4 This news
generated wide interest throughout the world.5 Delegations—including
journalists from the occupied and neutral countries, allied officers held

1.

Matthew Day, US ‘Hushed Up Katyn Massacre’, TELEGRAPH (UK),
Sept. 11, 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ news/worldnews/Europe/
poland/9535828/US-hushed-up-Katyn-massacre.html.

2.

Benjamin B. Fischer, The Katyn Controversy: Stalin’s Killing Field,
CIA, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/
csi-publications/ csi-studies/studies/winter99-00/art6.html (last updated
June 27, 2008).

3.

See Inessa Jazhborovskaya, The Katyn Case: Working to Learn the
Truth, RUSS. ACAD. SCI. SOC. SCI., 2011, at 34–35.

4.

149 CONG. REC. 8,556 (statement of Rep. Paul E. Kanjorski).

5.

KATYŃ :

DOKUMENTY ZBRODNI. T. 4, ECHA KATYNIA : KWIECIEŃ 1943 2005 [KATYN: DOCUMENTS OF A CRIME,ECHOES OF KATYN] 43
(Wojciech Materski et al. eds., 2006) [hereinafter KATYN: DOCUMENTS
OF A CRIME].
MARZEC
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in German camps, and forensic doctors—were dispatched to the
Katyn Forest; they all confirmed the terrible truth.6
On April 15, 1943, in response to the German revelation, Radio
Moscow published a communiqué from the Soviet Information Bureau
that expressed outrage, blamed the Germans for the massacre of
Polish officers, and promised punishment of “the German-Fascist
murderers” for this crime.7 The very first paragraph, implying that
Germany’s propaganda offensive was an effort to provoke the USSR,
establishes the key argument about German responsibility for the
crime:
In the past two or three days Goebbels’s slanderers have been
spreading vile fabrications alleging that Soviet authorities
effected a mass shooting of Polish officers in the spring of 1940,
in the Smolensk area. In launching this monstrous invention,
the German-Fascist scoundrels do not hesitate at the most
unscrupulous and base lie in their attempt to cover up crimes
which, as has now become evident, were perpetrated by
themselves.8

The second paragraph of the communiqué, which also appeared in
press publications, is also extremely important. This paragraph
foreshadows the future construction of a fraudulent version of the
events that the Soviet Union and its communist allies developed. The
Soviet Union officially declared:
The German-Fascist reports on this subject leave no doubt as to
the tragic fate of the former Polish POWs who in 1941 were
engaged in construction work in areas west of Smolensk and
who, along with many Soviet people, residents of the Smolensk
region, fell into the hands of the Soviet Fascist hangmen in the
summer of 1941, after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the
Smolensk area.9

6.

H.R. REP. No. 2430, at 35–38 (1952).

7.

KATYN: A CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT 306–07 (Anna M. Cienciala,
Natalia S. Lebedeva & Wojciech Materski eds., Marian Schwartz, Anna
M. Cienciala & Maia A. Kipp trans., 2007) (presenting Document 102
titled “Communiqué Issued by the Sovinformburo Attacking the
German ‘Fabrications’ about the Graves of Polish Officers in the Katyn
Forest”).

8.

See id. at 306. See also KATYN: DOCUMENTS
at 44–45.

9.

KATYN: A CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT, supra note 7, at 306. However,
the text refrains from giving a detailed reconstruction of the fate of the
Poles. Instead, the text basically deals with the crimes of the Nazis and
of their taking of the captives to slavery in the summer of 1941, rather
than a particular murder of Polish prisoners of war. Clearly, the authors
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This communiqué gave birth to the false Soviet version of the
murder of Polish prisoners of war, which ultimately become the Katyn
lie.10

II. Reactions to the Discoveries at Katyn
The German announcement in April 1943 about the discovery in
the Katyn Forest led the Polish government, which already had
evidence of the Soviet guilt, to consider the German version of events
as the most probable explanation and to attempt to clarify the fate of
the Poles through international institutions and their own studies. On
April 17, 1943, the Polish government asked the International Red
Cross in Bern to investigate the matter.11 At this time, the focus of
the press was not on the crime itself, but on the German efforts to
benefit from the crime.12
Days later, the Soviet newspaper Pravda attacked Poland for
asking the International Red Cross to investigate and for cooperating
with the German provocateurs from the Goebbels group.13 In contrast,
the Polish attitude was very restrained. The Polish government
withdrew its request to the International Red Cross under pressure
from Winston Churchill, who echoed the concerns of Franklin D.
Roosevelt.14 During the remaining years of World War II and after its
completion, the United States and Great Britain followed a policy of
concealing the truth and pushing the Katyn problem aside, laying the
foundation of Anglo-American policy towards the Katyn crime.
Unlike the Polish government, the Soviet government acted
decisively and ruthlessly. On April 25, 1943, the Soviet government,
(not yet familiar with all the strengths of the opponent) were afraid of
being called to provide details. Yet, the conclusion about the murder of
the officers appears irresistible to readers. The Soviets were not
prepared for this situation. This development probably encouraged them
to emphasize the topic of German provocation, not the murder itself,
and to use very aggressive rhetoric.
10.

In terms of language,”Katyn lie” is a structure analogous to that of
Auschwitz—each name designates a specific historical phenomenon.

11.

The Katyn Massacre, WWII Behind Closed Doors, PBS,
http://www.pbs.org/behindcloseddoors/in-depth/katyn-massacre.html
(last visited Apr. 11, 2013).

12.

See ADAM MOSZYNSKI, LISTA KATYŃSKA : JEŃCY OBOZÓV KOZIELSK,
OSTASZKÓW, STAROBIELSK, ZAGINIENI W ROSJI SOWIECKIEJ 1988−89
(1982); ALAN PAUL, KATYŃ: STALIN’S MASSACRE AND SEEDS OF POLISH
RESSURECTION 237–38 (2003).

13.

See The Katyn Massacre, WWII Behind Closed Doors, supra note 11.

14.

See id. See also TADEUSZ CIEŚLAK ET AL., SPRAWA POLSKA W CZASIE
DRUGIEJ WOJNY ŚWIATOWEJ NA ARENIE MIĘDZYNARODOWEJ : ZBIÓR
DOKUMENTÓWT 347–48 (1965).
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based on the belief that the Polish government supported the German
efforts to shift the German responsibility for the Katyn crime to the
USSR, broke relations with Poland.15 In the subsequent months, the
Soviets began preparations for installation of the communist regime in
Poland and focused on developing a very complex structure of forgery,
building a legend of the German crime against the Poles.16 These
efforts were designed to legitimize the Katyn lie in international
public opinion.

III. Fabricating History at Katyn
The fabrication of the fundamental lies is well known today
thanks to Russian researchers’ work with documents from the Russian
archives (mainly the State Archive of the Russian Federation and, to
a lesser extent, Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History),
which Natalia Lebedeva and Wojciech Materski have already
discussed in great detail.17 The Polish public may now access these
documents thanks to a team working under the leadership of
Lebedeva and Materski.18 Original documents are available to

15. See EDWARD J. ROZEK, ALLIED WARTIME DIPLOMACY: A PATTERN IN
POLAND 127−28 (1958). Molotov wrote a letter to the Polish
Ambassador in the USSR regarding Poland’s “slanderous campaign.”
The letter concluded by stating that “the present Government of
Poland, having slid down the path of accord with Hitler’s Government,
ha[d] actually discontinued Allied relations with the U.S.S.R., and ha[d]
adopted a hostile attitude towards the Soviet Union.” Id.
16.

See id. at 133−35. In an effort to establish “a strong and independent
Poland” with “a government friendly to them,” the Soviets pursued
their own investigation of the Katyn massacre, propagated official and
media reports regarding Germany’s responsibility, created a Polish
Army that was politically controlled by the Soviets, and raised
underground organizations. The Soviets’ actions were “so effectively
propagandized that it misled Western public opinion as to the real
Soviet objectives.” Id.

17.

See, e.g., Natalia S. Lebedeva, Komisja Specjalna I Jej Przewodniczący
Burdenko, in ZBRODNIA KATYŃSKA MIĘDZY PRAWDĄ I KŁAMSTWEM
56−101 (2008); Wojciech J. Materski, From the Beginning of a
Propaganda War About the Katyn Massacre: Soviet Special Commission
(The Commission Burdenko), in REPRESJE SOWIECKIE WOBEC NARODÓW
EUROPY 1944-1956, at 20−28 (Dariusz Rogut & Arkadiusz Adamczyk
eds., 2005).

18.

The edited versions of the “preliminary investigation” of MerkulovKrugłowa and the so called “Burdenko Commission” are contained in
Katyń: Dokumenty Zbrodni (Katyn: Documents of a Crime), volume 4.
Some of the edited documents are quoted directly from the originals, but
the editors, Lebdeva and Materski, have reordered them to represent the
historiography.
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researchers on site in Moscow, and I had the opportunity to review
them.19
To construct a detailed, falsified contra-argument to the German
accusation to prove German responsibility for the Katyn crime, the
Soviets took advantage of the moment when the Soviet Army
regained the Smolensk territory at the end of September 1943.
Analyzing authorship of the Soviet-developed Katyn lie and the
fabrication of evidence for the internal investigation purposes is
complex. On September 22, 1943, when the Red Army was “30-35 km
[outside] of Katyn,” Chief of Propaganda and Agitation of the Central
Committee of the VCP (b), Georgi Alexandrov, wrote to the secretary
of the Central Committee Andrei Shcherbakov, pointing out the need
for “preparatory steps to expose the German provocation” and
proposing the establishment of a special committee consisting of
representatives from the Extraordinary State Commission for the
Investigation of Crimes of the German-Fascists and their
Accomplices.20 The Politburo of the VCP (b), the highest political
authority of the USSR, decided to implement the general plan
Alexandrov had proposed.21 However, the Politburo made some
modifications. Namely, it limited the first phase of work exclusively to
the activities of special security services and it designated the work as
secret.22 Only later did the Politburo allow other institutions to join
the investigation.23 This strategy ensured that the security apparatus
of the Soviet state shaped a key part of the Katyn investigation. This
delay of civilian access to and investigation of the crime scene
19.

The opportunity to access documents of team 7021, inv. 114, vol. 6
(Krugłov-Merkulov Commission) and inv. 114, vol. 8 (Burdenko
Commission) at the Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii
(GARF) was of key significance [hereinafter GARF Documents]. For
help during my query in Moscow, I would like to thank Hieronim Grala,
Magdalene Gumkowska and all sympathetic Russian people. See also
ArcheoBiblioBase: Archives in Russia: B-1, INT’L INST. OF SOC. HIST.
(Feb. 8, 2013), http://www.iisg.nl/abb/rep/B-1.tab1.php (for a
description of GARF and its archives).

20.

KATYN: DOCUMENTS OF A CRIME, supra note 5, at 121. See also KATYN:
A CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT, supra note 7, at 226−27.

21.

KATYN: A CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT, supra note 7, at 226−29
(describing the implementation and scope of “the Special State
Commission for Ascertaining and Investigating the Circumstances of the
Shooting of the Polish Prisoners of War by the German Fascist Invaders
in the Katyn Forest,” more commonly known as the Burdenko
Commission).

22.

See GEORGE SANFORD, KATYN AND THE SOVIET MASSACRE OF 1940:
TRUTH AND MEMORY 136–38 (2005) (recounting the formation of the
secret Soviet commission to investigate the massacre).

23.

Id. at 139 (recounting the introduction of outside parties to the
investigation).
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regarding the Soviet secret police’s activity suggests that the secret
police were better suited for operational front-line work and indicates
a limited trust towards civilian investigation.
For these reasons, there was a delay in granting Nikolai
Burdenko, a member of the Extraordinary State Commission, access
to the Katyn site. Burdenko requested permission to begin conducting
fieldwork on September 27, just two days after the entry of the Red
Army to Smolensk.24 He and his infamous committee appeared on the
crime scene several weeks later. The NKVD and the People’s
Commissariat for State Security (NKGB) effectively took full control
over the initially weak coordination of the investigation. Certain
initial indecisiveness as to the tactics of investigation may have
resulted from the unusual nature, even by Soviet standards, of the
crimehcommitted.
The nervous Politburo decision-makers who approved the death
order of the Polish officers in March 1940 were pushing for quick and
decisive action at the expense of methodical and professional
investigation. The officers who carried out the death orders from
NKVD Chief Lavrenty Beria hastened to camouflage their crimes.25
Even trusted members of the scientific establishment of the party,
including Burdenko, were excluded.26 Joseph Stalin eventually
endorsed the preparation and manipulation of the crime scene.27
As a result of these efforts, it was the murderers of the Polish
officers who had the first opportunity to conduct a preliminary
investigation of the Katyn crime; this laid the groundwork for further
concealment. In September and October 1943, NKVD and NKGB
officers from headquarters in Moscow and from the NKVD Board of
the Smolensk Oblast arrived at the crime scene. These were the very
same people who best knew about the murders, because they
participated in them. Leonid Rajchman, a head of counterintelligence
of the NKGB, commanded the initial operations in the Katyn region.
Deputy People’s Commissar of Internal Affairs Sergei Krugłow and
People’s Commissar of State Security Vsevolod Merkulov guided and
oversaw the whole operation from Moscow. Both men were members
of the “troika” the NKVD designated to implement the Katyn order
on March 5, 1940.28 The two of them made several on-site inspections
in 1943.29
24.

See KATYN: A CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT, supra note 7, at 226. See
also GARF Documents, supra note 19, doc. 38, at 122.

25.

See KATYN: A CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT, supra note 7, at 227.

26.

See id. at 228.

27.

Cf. id. at 228–29 (indicating the top Soviet officials agreed to share the
Burdenko report as an official investigative report).

28.

Cf.INESSA JAŻBOROWSKA, ANATOLIJ JABŁOKOW & JURIJ ZORIA,
KATÝN:ZBRODNIA CHRONIONA TAJEMNICĄ PAŃSTWOWĄ 285–86 (1998).
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From the beginning of October 1943 to January 1944, officers of
the NKVD and NKGB made efforts to hide the truth about the
crimes and create a false picture of the fate of Polish prisoners of war.
Operational activities of the officers under Krugłow and Merkulov,
partially described later as “the initial investigation into the so-called
Katyn matter” involved, inter alia: 1) securing the site of a crime and
concealment of bodies from outsiders; 2) opening, between October
and December 1943, the pits with bodies; and 3) preparing evidence
for the future “exhumations” in order to draw manipulated
conclusions about innocence and guilt.30 The second task involved the
fabrication of documents with dates from the second half of 1940 and
first half of 1941, demonstrating the Soviet attempts to show that the
Polish victims were still alive during that time frame. The fabricated
documents were slipped into the corpses to be later “discovered” as
evidence of German guilt.31 These actions, which rank among the
most secret and arcane of the secret service, were very enigmatically
incorporated in the report on the outcome of the investigative
committee led by Krugłow and Merkulov.32 Such conduct is clear from
the analysis of documents at the Russian archives and has been
confirmed by the Military’s Prosecutor General of Russia.33
The main focus of the Krugłow-Merkulov team was, however, the
collection of live testimony—that is collecting false testimony in
writing, preparing witnesses to confirm the false version of events, and
ruthlessly eliminating any witnesses who would dare to proclaim the
truth. Of interest were people with knowledge of the circumstances of

The specific contribution of individual officers is visible in the files
“Investigation of Merkulov and Kruglov,” Государственный архив
Российской Федерации (ГАРФ) (GARF). In fact, the investigation
dealt with the work of two departments, whose work was coordinated by
the semi-official inter-ministerial “committee” of Merkulov and Kruglov.
29.

See KATYN: A CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT, supra note 7, at 227.

30.

See id. at 227–28.

31.

The record shows for example, a paper written by Stanislaw Kuczynski
on June 20, 1941, which was evidently added. Kuczynski did not die in
Katyn. Burdenko Commission expert Zubkov Konstantin cited other
“discovered” papers from the exhumation (for example, the cited piece
of the body No. 53).See Lebiediewa, supra note 17, at 65–67; GARF
Documents, supra note 19, unit 7021, inv. 114, vol. 9, k. 6–8.

32.

See Lebedeva, supra note 17, at 64–65 (stating that Krugłow and
Merkulov’s work was described in a way that clarified that the Germans
were deployed in Katyn Forest and were responsible for the crime).

33.

See id. at 65. The General Military Prosecutor of the Russian
Federation has obtained evidence in this case from those directly
involved in the forgery.
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the crime as well as those who had nothing to do with it.34 The
favorite and frequently used method was to intimidate and blackmail
the targeted persons by threatening them with accusations of
collaboration with the Germans during the occupation.35
NKGB authorities working on the 1943-1944 preliminary
investigation took advantage of the military counterintelligence
investigations by SMERSH that focused on charges of collaboration
with the Germans that began even before their arrival in the Katyn
region.36 It should be remembered that Soviet citizens who were at
risk of being accused of collaboration with the Nazis were usually
willing to bend to the will of their interrogators from the triumphant
Soviet state.37 At the same time, investigators gathered evidence of
people whose authentic but partial knowledge of the conditions under
German occupation would, when placed in the right context, serve to
build the falsified version of events. Force was typically applied
towards persons who had previously been called as witnesses by the
German and the international commissions.38 These people were
forced to change their testimony.39
In the arsenal of their measures, the terror of isolation played an
important role. People either succumbed to the NKVD-NKGB
demands or were isolated from the world, and if still resistant, were
physically “liquidated.”40 After softening potential witnesses with
brutal methods, the NKVD-NKGB interrogated nearly 100 people and
verified an additional seventeen statements for the Extraordinary

34.

See
Inessa Jażborowska
&
Anatolij
Jabłokow, Katynskoje
priestuplenije:baromietr
sostojanija
prawa
w
czełowieczeskom
izmierienii, in MIEŻDU PROSZŁYM I BUDUSZCZIM264 (1999). Range of
genuine knowledge about the crime of “locals” witnesses should not be
overestimated. See also KATYN: A CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT, supra
note 7, at 227 (recounting that “witnesses” who had worked for the
Germans in Smolensk were threatened with the death penalty for
collaborating with the enemy, and thus “agreed to say whatever they
were told”).

35.

See KATYN: A CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT, supra note 7, at 227.

36.

See GARF Documents, supra note 19, unit 7021, inv. 114, vol. 8, k.
262–63, 255–60. The original connection with SMERSH during the
massacre investigation is not obvious in my opinion.

37.

See KATYN: A CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT, supra note 7, at 227.

38.

See Milena Sterio, Katyn Forest Massacre: Of Genocide, State Lies, and
Secrecy, 44 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 615, 621 (2012).

39.

See,
e.g.,
Misinformation:
The
Key
to
Soviet
Policy,
http://www.pomniksmolensk.pl/news.php?readmore=2395 (last visited
Apr. 8, 2013).

40.

See Lebedeva, supra note 17, at 62 (discussing the “single cell” and
“liquidation”).
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State Commission.41 The activity of the Soviet security apparatus
consisted of collecting interviews and compiling material evidence,
such as German leaflets from 1943, which were then widely
disseminated as the documentation of the Commission.42
Reporting on the overall investigative work is not at this point
necessary because, fortunately, many researchers have already
addressed this issue.43 However, it should be emphasized that while
collecting testimonies, the investigators simultaneously were preparing
selected persons for “live” testimony in the future. For example, the
NKGB-NKVD forced an important witness, Parfion Kisielow, to
revoke his testimony from 1943 in front of foreign journalists. His case
typified the phenomenon of “inverted” witnesses.44 The testimony of
Boris Bazilevsky, deputy mayor of Smolensk during the German
occupation, offers another example of careful witness preparation by
the Krugłow-Merkulov team. Bazilevsky presented a complex
“legend” about his connection to the Katyn case and became a
member of a small group of Soviet witnesses during the Nuremberg
Trial.45
The findings of the Krugłow-Merkulov team known as “The
Special Committee Composed of Representatives of Relevant Bodies”
in the crucial period from October 5, 1943 to January 10, 1944, were
summarized in the Information on the Results of a Preliminary
Investigation into the So-Called Katyn Matter(Information of a
Preliminary Investigation).46 This document, signed by the two abovementioned individuals,47 concludes:

41.

See GARF Documents, supra note 19, unit 7021, inv. 114, vol. 6, k. 1.
The Commission’s report on this time period (through January 10)
indicates that ninety-five witnesses were called and a few days later
Krugłow discussed ninety-three interviews. In addition, the committee
had collected seventeen statements from “people who have come
forward,” or, as far as I understand, have come up with their own
initiative to clarify in writing.

42.

See id.

43.

Natalia Lebedeva and Wojciech Materski provide the most complete
description of the work of both committees (ministerial and state).

44.

See Misinformation: The Key to Soviet Policy, supra note 39.

45.

See Nuremberg Trial, Proceedings vol. 17 (July 1, 1946) (transcript of
Boris Bazilevsky testifying as a witness).

46.

KATYN: A CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT, supra note 17, at 227.

47.

GARF Documents, supra note 19, unit 7021, inv. 114, vol. 6, k. 1–53.
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1. The Polish prisoners of war were working on a road
construction project from the spring of 1940 to June 1941
(that is until the beginning of the Soviet-German war) west of
Smolensk.48
2. The prisoners of war were captured by the Germans in late
August and September 1941.49
3. The shooting of Polish prisoners of war in the autumn of 1941
in the Katyn Forest was carried out by an “unknown German
military institution” that was stationed in a dacha in “Kozy
Gory” until the end of September 1943. Colonel Ahrens
commanded the unit; his closest associates and accomplices in
this crime were Lieutenant Rechst and Second Lieutenant
Hott.50
4. After the shooting of the prisoners of war on orders from
Berlin in the autumn of 1941, Germany undertook proactive
efforts to assign their despicable crimes to the Soviet power.51

Next, the NKVD-NKGB stressed the fact that the Germans also
killed 500 Russian prisoners of war who were digging the Katyn
graves.52 With outright hypocrisy the committee emphatically
concluded that the Germans murdered the Soviet prisoners of war to
cover up German crimes and as part of the German “planned policy
of extermination of the ‘inferior’ Slavic nations.”53 The Katyn lie,
made possible by the mystification of the crime by the NKVD-NKGB
and the report of the Krugłow-Merkulov committee, became the
official position of the Soviet state.
The Information of a Preliminary Investigation did not signify
the conclusion of activities of the Krugłow-Merkulov team. For
example, a document entitled A Supplement to the Information of S.
Krugłow on the Results of Preliminary Investigation on the Katyn
Massacre Dated 18 January 1944 summarizes successive
48.

The Truth About Katyn: Report of The Special Commission for
Ascertaining And Investigating The Circumstances of The Shooting of
Polish Officer Prisoners by The German-Fascist Invaders in The Katyn
Forest, SOVIET WAR NEWS WEEKLY (supplement), Jan. 24, 1944, at 1–2
[hereinafter
The
Truth
About
Katyn],
available
at
http://libraries.ucsd.edu/speccoll/DigitalArchives/d804_r9-t781944/d804_r9-t78-1944.pdf.

49.

See id. at 2–3.

50.

See id.

51.

See id. at 4.

52.

See id. at 7.

53.

See GARF Documents, supra note 19, unit 7021, inv. 114, vol. 6, k.
1952–53. See also KATYN: DOCUMENTS OF A CRIME, supra note 5, at 162.
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achievements. Merkulov and Krugłow state in the document, citing
data obtained from the Board of Foreign Intelligence of the General
Staff of the Red Army, that “this unknown German military
institution [under the command of ‘Arnes,’ actually Friedrich Ahrens,
listed above]in the German Army had a staff of 537 on the
construction battalion.”54 The Soviets used this information to provide
an altered account of the Katyn case at Nuremberg with disastrous
results.
In the future, adjustments to the “reconstruction of the events”
were superficial and made only in exceptional circumstances when
necessitated by situations where defending the detail was too harmful
for the overall consistency of the forgery and lie. For example, the
original dates of “the end of August and September 1941” as a
possible date of crime were changed to the “fall of 1941.” Such
manipulation clearly indicates the decisive role of the KrugłowMerkulov committee in the construction and management of the
Katyn lie.
The completion of the first phase of the Krugłow-Merkulov
investigation on January 10, 1944, and the completion of the drafting
of the report just two days later was not accidental and was logically
placed within the chronology of the construction of the Katyn lie.
Since then, the information and materials gathered by this committee
were to be used by an official state commission on the investigation of
the Katyn crime. The formulation of final conclusions55 on January
12, 1944, even before the end of operations by the security committee,
clearly indicates that from the outset these conclusions were regarded
as a guideline on the matter for the state commission and for the
general public.

IV. The Katyn Lie as Propaganda for the Soviet
State: The Burdenko Commission
At a meeting in Moscow of the Extraordinary State Commission
on January 12, 1944, (more than three months after Nikolai
Burdenko’s request to start an investigation), a Special Commission
for the Findings and Examination of the Circumstances Surrounding
the Shooting by the German Fascist Invaders in the Katyn Forest
(near Smolensk) of the Prisoners of War(the Burdenko Commission),
was set up and its composition was established.56
The Burdenko Commission was formed by a resolution, signed by
President of the Extraordinary State Commission, Nikolai Szwernik,
who also acted as an alternate member of the Political Bureau of the
54.

See GARF Documents, supra note 19, unit 7021, inv. 114, vol. 7, k. 1–9.

55.

See KATYN: A CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT, supra note 17, at 227.

56.

See GARF Documents, supra note 19, unit 7021, inv. 114, vol. 8, k. 39.
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VCP (b).57 The Politburo approved the resolution without
amendment and it was noted in the relevant protocol on January 13,
1944.58
In the preparation of this document, Andrei Wyszynski prepared
a preliminary draft, Vyacheslav Molotov and Lavrenty Beria gave it
the shape of a politically “mature” working draft, and Stalin approved
it.59 It should be noted that Molotov, after consultation with Beria,
made changes to the proposed composition of the committee Stalin
had approved.60 The composition of the Burdenko Commission
included Nikolai Burdenko, member of the Academy of Science, was
chairman of the committee; Alexei Tolstoy; Nikolai Metropolitan;
General Alexander Gundorow, Chairman of the General Pan Slavic
Committee; Sergei Kolesnikov, Chairman of the Executive Committee
of Red Cross and Red Crescent; Vladimir Potemkin, People’s
Commissar of Education RFSRS Academician; Lieutenant General
Yefim Smirnov, Head of the Main Military-Sanitary Board of the Red
Army; and Riodon Melnikov, Chairman of the Smolensk Regional
Executive Committee of the VCP (b).61
The activities of the Burdenko Commission can be recreated
thanks to documents from a briefcase stored in the Russian archives
and extracted from oblivion by Russian researchers. These documents
not only provide insight into the results of the Burdenko Commission
but also into the behind-the-scene works of the Burdenko
Commission. The Burdenko Commission held six meetings, including
two on January 18 at 11:00 a.m. and 11:50 p.m.62 The Commission
announced the results of its work on January 24, 1944.63
The inaugural meeting of the Burdenko Commission in Moscow
left no doubt as to the direction in which the Commission would go.
Deputy Commissioner of Internal Affairs Sergei Krugłow took part in

57.

See Natalia S. Lebedeva, Katyn Massacre 441 (undated), available at
http://press.princeton.edu/chapters/pons/s5_9143.pdf (explaining the
establishment of the Burdenko Commission).

58.

KATYN: DOCUMENTS OF A CRIME, supra note 5, at 171.

59.

See Lebdevea, supra note 47, at 441 (noting that Molotov and Beria
made proposals to the resolution and Stalin had to approve such
changes).

60.

See id. (“Molotov, with Beria’s consent, proposed including in the
commission the chair and another member of the Central Directorate of
the Union of Polish Patriots, which had been created in Moscow.”).

61.

See KATYN: A CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT, supra note 17, at227–
28.Alexei Tolstoy was a famous writer of genuine achievements is one of
the luminaries of Russian literature.

62.

See id. at 318.

63.

See id. at 319 (reprinting the Commission’s report).
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its meeting on January 13, 1944.64 Krugłow presented the findings of
his commission, and these findings were accepted members by the
members of the Burdenko Commission without the slightest
discussion, as evidenced by transcripts of the proceedings.65 Krugłow,
focusing on the document Information, emphasized the evidence
gathered from witnesses. Burdenko, Tolstoy, Metropolitan, Potemkin,
Gundorow, and Makarov all spoke at the meeting.66 Discussion was
limited to neutral comments on the Krugłow information; an
exchange between Tolstoy, Krugłow, and Burdenko is illustrative:
TOLSTOY: The most basic statement is that the Poles were still
alive after our withdrawal from Smolensk.
KRUGŁOW: Very many witnesses testify that in autumn 1943
Germans escorted small groups of Poles, about 30-40 each in
vehicles to the Katyn Forest.
TOLSTOY: I think that at upon opening of the graves there
should certainly be some documents, cards, notes, letters dated
later than 1940.
KRUGŁOW: Later than the spring of 1940; for sure it will be
representative material evidence. . . .
BURDENKO: As we heard from a speech by Comrade Krugłow,
this matter is serious, and I propose to discuss the plan of our
work.67

There was no discussion of essential questions on the Katyn
massacre of primary interest to the world opinion either in this
meeting or at any other meeting. Further deliberations that day
related only to the technical and organizational aspects of work in
Smolensk and Katyn.68
The work of the Burdenko Commission consisted of collecting
“evidence” for developing and supporting the fabricated version of the
German responsibility for the murder of the Poles. The Commission
did not investigate who perpetrated the crime. As explicitly stated in
the name of this body, the Commission only investigated the
“circumstances of the shooting by the German-Fascist invaders of the

64.

See id. at 227–28.

65.

See id. at 228.

66.

See id. at 227–28.

67.

GARF Documents, supra note 19, unit 7021, inv. 114, vol. 8, k. 1937–
58. See also KATYN: DOCUMENTS OF A CRIME, supra note 5, at 181.

68.

See id.
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Katyn Forest.”69 Gathering evidence in practice was limited to the
recording of evidence gathered by the Krugłow committee. Using
previously prepared materials extracted from the Katyn pits and
witness testimonies selected from among those previously prepared by
the NKVD-NKGB, the Burdenko Commission was able to issue its
ruling within ten days.
A brief period of work and reliance on the report presented by the
security apparatus does not mean, however, that the activity of the
Commission had a completely fictitious character, limited just to
signing in Moscow of protocols prepared by others. Members of the
commission, with the help and under the supervision of the NKVDNKGB, carried out fieldwork, including the inspection of death pits,
visual inspection of bodies, and questioning witnesses.70 At a meeting
on January 18, 1944, at 11:00 a.m. it was decided that all members of
the Commission would travel to the excavation site in the Katyn
Forest in order to see the graves and determine how to prepare for
the exhumation of corpses.71 Since January 14, excavations were
conducted there under the direction of Krugłow, with Rodion
Melnikova from the Commission.72 At the second meeting on the same
day, which began ten minutes before midnight and in the presence of
Victor Prozorowski and Victor Siemionowski, the Commission decided
on a further division of tasks between its members into two groups: 1)
excavation of corpses and forensic medical examination and 2)
interviewing witnesses and systematization.73
Holding two meetings in one day proves that the pace of the
implementation of the tasks was of great importance. The exhaustive
schedule of the working day from 9:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. and from 4:00
p.m. to 11:00 p.m.74 also proves this point. While urgency was real,
the involvement of the members ranged from serious (Burdenko,
Potemkin, and Tolstoy) to minor (Smirnov and Gundurow). In the
next few days, members of the Commission were overseeing
exhumations with the participation of experts in forensic medicine
and interviewed witnesses. On January 19, 1944 in Smolensk, the
Burdenko Commission held its fourth meeting, interviewing and

69.

GEORGE SANFORD, KATYN AND THE SOVIET MASSACRE
JUSTICE AND MEMORY 137 (2005).

70.

See KATYN: A CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT, supra note 17, at 314–
18(reprinting the “Report of the Polish Red Cross Technical
Commission on Its Work in Katyn,” which describes the Commission’s
research at Katyn).

71.

See GARF Documents, supra note 19, unit 7021, inv. 114, vol. 8, k. 64.

72.

See id. k.63–64.

73.

See id. at k. 96–97.

74.

See id.
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summarizing the results of the exhumation work, including forensic
medicine experts.75 The fifth meeting was held on January 20, in
Smolensk.76 During the meeting, Burdenko stated, “We finished
interviewing witnesses, but we have to do another job. . . . Our
planned work is coming to an end. We should hurry up with the
audio recording. You have to choose the material, prepare it.”77 This
meant the end of the basic phase of “investigative” operations and
moving to a stage of preparing the conclusions that were to be used as
propaganda material. Accordingly, from January 13–20, 1944, the
commission performed a series of labor-intensive activities. Regardless
of the effort invested in the work carried out by the Burdenko
Commission, a complex investigation and reconstruction of the events
surrounding the murder of the Polish officers in such a short time was
impossible.
Furthermore, the investigation was not conducted independently.
The Commission used material gathered earlier by the perpetrators of
the crime, exclusively and without objection. Information from the
exhumation work conducted by the Commission on January 14, 1944,
was based on the material prepared by the NKVD-NKGB.
Preparations included tossing fake evidence into the pits of the dead.78
The Burdenko Commission chose witnesses from among those
questioned by the NKVD-NKGB, focusing merely on “jointly”
selecting the “most useful,” while ignoring the rest of the earlier
testimonies and not calling any new witnesses. In practice, this meant
that the Commission only heard from people “prepared” by the Soviet
apparatus of coercion.79 It should be noted that the relationship
between the Krugłow-Merkulov team vis-a-vis the Burdenko
Commission reversed the normal policy for investigations—an
investigative organ should secure evidence for the prosecuting body,
but in this case, the prosecuting body secured the evidence for the
investigative organ. The organ conducting the preliminary
investigation imposed its version of events upon the prosecuting body,
and the prosecuting organ only helped in its development. During the
preparatory proceedings, a verdict was formed first, and then
Commission wrote its justification. The Commission only helped write
the justification; officers of the Krugłow’s Security Ministry
75.

See id. at k.146–48.

76.

See id. at k.179–80.

77.

See id. at k. 146.

78.

See INESSA JAŻBOROWSKA, ANATOLIJ JABŁOKOW & JURIJ ZORIA, supra
note 28, at 233–34, 258. See also JOLANTA ADAMSKA, ANDRZEJ
PRZEWOŹNIK , Katyń. Zbrodnia-Prawda-Pamięć, at 359–60 (2010).

79.

Compare GARF Documents, supra note 19, unit 7021, inv. 114, vol. 6,
k. 1–53 and unit 7021, inv. 114, vol. 7, k. 1– 9 with GARF Documents,
supra note 19, unit 7021, inv. 114, vol. 8, k. 92–110, 111–42, 146–78.
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participated in the investigation and complemented the Commission’s
work by supplementing their earlier Information of a Preliminary
Investigation.
In light of the observation that the Burdenko Commission served
a subsidiary and secondary role to the Krugłow team, a question
arises as to the purpose of interviewing the same witnesses and
searching the same mass graves as in the “preliminary investigation.”
In light of the weak logic of the construction of the Katyn lie, such
activities make perfect sense. The work of the Commission was not
used for reaching the truth about Katyn, or even for inventing a false
version of events, as this was already done. The Commission was to
prepare materials on Katyn for the purpose of Soviet propaganda.
Documentation was to be presented by persons with prestige and
authority higher than the NKVD, including forensic experts and
scientists using professional terminology. In short, the findings of the
Burdenko Commission offered propaganda material of a higher quality
than that produced by the security apparatus. Some of the members
of the Commission were likely concerned about the use of their
reputation for such purposes and, hence, insisted on carrying out work
at the crime scene and interviewing witnesses before signing off on the
final documents.
The crowning of the work of the Burdenko Commission was the
preparation of the communiqué and presentation for the press
conference. The Commission, recognizing an urgent need to present
material to the international community, organized a press conference
for mostly foreign journalists, held on January 22, 1944, even though
the Commission had yet to officially publish its findings from the
investigation.80 Potemkin and Tolstoy conducted the conference, with
the participation of Metropolitan and Burdenko.81 During the initial
part of the conference, the journalists were given a long statement,
which included the important conclusion: “It can be considered as
established that in the autumn, in August to September 1941,
Germany shot in Kozie Gory Polish prisoners of war.”82 In the second
part, intended only for foreign correspondents, which in practice
meant the Anglo-Saxons, the journalists had the opportunity to ask
questions.83 During the conference, testimonies of witnesses were
presented; some witnesses appeared personally.84

80.

Fischer, supra note 2.

81.

GARF Documents, supra note 19, unit 7021, inv. 114, vol. 8, k. 207–35.

82.

See id. at k. 207–26 (initial part).

83.

See id. at k. 227–35 (part for foreign journalists).

84.

See id. at k. 237–57 (hearings before the commission in presence of
foreign journalists).
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In addition to false testimonies presented by Bazilevsky, Parfiona
Kisielowa, and women employed in the “dacha” in the Katyn Forest,
the Commission emphasized the prominence of “the father Alexander
Ogloblin” as a witness “presented by the first hierarchy of the
Orthodox Metropolitan Nikolai.”85 Ogloblin was a priest from the
church in the village Kurpino, situated in an area of the Katyn
Forest.86 This testimony was a creative contribution of the Burdenko
Commission to the propaganda of the Katyn lie. In addition to
questions, reporters were shown an exhibition of objects excavated
from the death pits. Undoubtedly, this was an effort to appeal to the
reporters’ emotions and possibly cause them to make the following
inference: since the Soviets were showing evidence of these crimes,
they could not have committed them.87 The entire show was the joint
work of the Krugłow-Merkulov and Burdenko teams. Thanks to this
conference, world public opinion absorbed the Soviet version of
events, not only through the Soviet mass media but also through
foreign correspondents in the USSR.
It is likely that organizers of the conference also wanted to
present the world with details of the Katyn lie that were, up to that
point, held behind closed doors. No one considered the possibility that
the international community would contest the Katyn lie. However,
the Soviets wanted an opportunity to safely test the details and
possible weak points of the forgery. It was the last moment for the
Soviets, at a relatively low cost, to make additions and even make
some adjustments in the constructed history. For example, an
American journalist asked if the Committee noticed that the victims
were dressed too heavily in sweaters and warm underwear for the
August and September weather.88 Potemkin replied that cool nights
begin in September (ignoring August), and Tolstoy tortuously
explained that the men had no other clothing.89 Perhaps this exchange
85.

See id. at k. 223–24.

86.

See The Truth About Katyn, supra note 48, at 4.

87.

See id. at 9, 12. Recalling his visit to the Katyn graves, Doctor Zhukov
said, “As a result of my visit to the excavation site, I became firmly
convinced that a monstrous crime had been committed by the
Germans.” Id. at 9. The Special Commission then stated, “The
conclusions drawn from the evidence given by witnesses . . . are
completely confirmed by the material evidence and documents
excavated from the Katyn graves.” Id. at 12.

88.

Cf. Investigation of the Murder of Thousands of Polish Officers in the
Katyn Forest Near Smolensk, Russia: Hearing before the Select
Committee to Conduct an Investigation of the Facts, Evidence, and
Circumstances of the Katyn Forest Massacre, 82nd Cong. 316 (1952)
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contributed to the replacement in subsequent Soviet documents of the
August and September 1941 timeframe (alternatively, the end of
August and September) with the phrase “autumn” of 1941.
The day after the press conference, January 23, 1944, the
Commission held its sixth meeting in Smolensk. Burdenko stated that
“the documents found are fully convincing, and determine that the
time of the shooting dates for the autumn of 1941.” He explained that
the Commission had interviewed all witnesses of interest and
summarized their testimonies. The last task for the Commission was
to edit the already developed forensic medical material.90 Only when
Burdenko assured the members that the final draft was almost ready
was it possible to conclude the work in Smolensk. The Commission
decided to hear one more witness, which was done in Smolensk on the
same day.91 Although some Commission member suggested continuing
work as long as possible, the Commission formally decided to extend
the work of forensic medical experts only to January 27; the work of
the Commission effectively ended within twenty-four hours after the
issuance of the final communiqué. The time pressure was closely
associated with the German dissemination, at the turn of 1944, of the
true information about the Soviet role in the Katyn Forest massacre,
in particular a detailed documentation prepared in 1943 in Berlin on
the Katyn crime.92
The fact that the Commission completed its work before the
agreed upon date indicates that the state exerted pressure to stop
work immediately. The records from the last meeting preceding the
final announcement show that only some of the members of the
Committee (including Burdenko) participated in drafting of the final
statement,93 and it’s possible that their participation was fairly
limited. Without a doubt, the discussion of the form and content of
the Commission’s summary did not include all of the Commission
members. In fact, officers of the security ministries from NKGBNKVD provided substantive and technical assistance to the Burdenko
Commission in its preparation of the final text.94
A short document entitled Forensic-Medical Expertise of the
Katyn Graves was probably prepared in Moscow around January 23,
1944, at the time of the meeting of the Burdenko Commission at

90.

See id. at k. 267–68.

91.

Investigation of the Murder of Thousands of Polish Officers, supra note
94, at 246–47.

92.

See generally AMTLICHES MATERIAL ZUM MASSENMORD
(1943), available at http://codoh.com/node/999.

93.

See GARF Documents, supra note 19, unit 7021, inv. 114, vol. 8, k.
267–68.

94.

See id. at k. 268.
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Smolensk.95 Theoretically, this document was to serve as evidence for
the Commission, which combined with other evidence allowed for
reconstruction of the events studied. In practice, no expert could have
evaluated this document before the formal announcement of the
results a day later. This document included certain conclusions that
lacked any support from the forensic medical evidence and, in fact,
could never have resulted from the forensic evidence. For example,
the statement that “the liquidation of Polish POWs in the Katyn
Forest was done by [Ahrens, Rechst, and Hott] in accordance with a
directive from Berlin”96 had nothing to do with forensic expertise.
Conclusions formulated in this document were, in light of the
available contemporary knowledge, far-reaching in scope, and most
importantly were false.97 All the conclusions were designed to prove
the thesis that the Germans were responsible for the crime against the
Polish prisoners. The report summarized that “on the basis of
macroscopic research it can be concluded that changes in the outside
tissue, soft tissue and internal organs, bones, skeletal and fittings
correspond with a period of two years.”98 This timing was designed to
point to the years 1941 and 1942, when Katyn was in the hands of
the Germans, not Russians.
Generally, it can be concluded that between January 16–26, 1944,
experts conducted actual research in the field and exhumed corpses,99

95.

See id. at k.193–201. See also KATYN: DOCUMENTS OF A CRIME, supra
note 5, at 280. At the outset of the Expertise (that is stored in a
briefcase of the Burdenko Commission and which is actually a loose
typescript, not a document), without any embarrassment, a reference
was made to the conclusions of the entire Commission, which in theory
did not yet exist. The documents could have been backdated.

96.

See GARF Documents, supra note 19, unit 7021, inv. 114, vol. 8, k. 194.

97.

The categorical conclusions drawn from the available data were
impossible considering contemporary methods. Thus the conclusions
that were made were deliberately subordinated to the false thesis. It
should be noted that, contrary to popular opinions, activities related to
the inspection of the death pits and testing of the exhumed bodies could
not—at the then existing state of knowledge—give a clear and
unarguable answers to questions about the time of the murder of POWs,
and so unquestionably determine the identity the perpetrators, and
could be useful only when compared with data collected by other means.
Earlier correct conclusions made under the auspices of the German
investigation in 1943 stemmed more from the examination of documents
and hearing witnesses than from medical forensic testing.

98.

See GARF Documents, supra note 19, unit 7021, inv. 114, vol. 8, k. 198.
See also KATYN: DOCUMENTS OF A CRIME, supra note 5, at 280.

99.

Report on the Work of the Forensic Medical Experts for the Exhumation
and Examination of Corpses of Polish Prisoners of War in Katyn
Forest, Together with Daily Work, February 1, 1944, in KATYN:
DOCUMENTS OF A CRIME, supra note 5, at 321–23. The report stated that
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but their findings and conclusions presented in the were unreliable.
The conclusions of the forensic-medical experts under the leadership
of the Chief Medical Forensic Examiner for the USSR People’s
Commissariat of Health Victor Prozorowki, falsified the reality.100
These falsified forensic results were included in the main report of the
Burdenko Commission and ultimately became part of the Katyn lie.
The Burdenko Commission issued its communiqué on January 24,
1944. On that date, all members of the Commission formally signed
the document. The communiqué was subsequently released on
January 26, published in Pravda, and referenced by the Telegraph
Agency of the Soviet Union (TASS) and other newspapers.101 The
release of the communiqué on January 24, 1944, completed the basic
work of the Commission, but Burdenko—very involved in the
promotion of its product—continued his correspondence and, at least
on paper, the Commission convened again many times.102
The January 24, 1944 communiqué became the most important
official Soviet text of the Katyn lies. It presents a full Soviet version
of events related to the murder of Polish prisoners of war at Katyn.
This document was frequently used to present the Soviet version of
the Katyn crime on many occasions between the 1940s and late
1980s.103 It was promoted in the USSR and all Eastern bloc countries,
in particular in communist Poland.104 The communiqué often
published in whole or in part in high-volume editions, became the
best-known text on the Katyn lie.
Today, it is pointless to discuss the details of this extensive,
sinister report. In general, the content of the communiqué can is best
summarized in several chapters that cite the testimony of witnesses
and list fabricated documents. One of the chapters represents a report
the supposed 1,380 exhumed bodies that were subjected to necropsy was
an overestimation, or that the research performed was very sketchy.
100. The Commission failed to produce the forensic medical expertise; it is
impossible to question the expertise of experts working under the
direction of Victor Prozorowki, but no doubt their knowledge was used
in the wrong way.
101. GARF Documents, supra note 19, unit 7021, inv. 114, vol. 8, k. 317–48.
See also KATYN: DOCUMENTS OF A CRIME, supra note 5, at 289–317.
102. Minutes of 28th Meeting of the Special Commission of 23 March 1944
(from the Extraordinary State Commission), in GARF Documents,
supra note 19, unit 7021, inv. 114, vol. 19, k. 24–25. See also KATYN:
DOCUMENTS OF A CRIME, supra note 5, at 334–35.
103. See Richard J. Hunter, Katyn: Old Issues Threaten Polish-Russian
Economic and Political Relations, 17 EUR. J. SOC. SCI. 288, 290–91
(2010).
104. Cf. id. at 290 (noting that the communiqué was translated in numerous
languages for the widest possible dissemination). The communiqué was
first published in Pravda, Moscow, in 1944.
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of the forensic medical experts.105 This report is dated January
1944, from Smolensk, and is signed by five experts, headed
Prozorowski.106
The “General Conclusion” summarizes the reasoning of
Burdenko Commission in eleven points. Of particular interest
points nine through eleven:

24,
by
the
are

Of all the materials available to the Special Commission—
namely, the testimony of more than 100 witnesses questioned by
the Commission, the report of forensic-medical experts and
material evidence recovered from the graves of the Katyn Forest
the following conclusions can be made. . . .
9) The data of the forensic medical expertise shows without
any doubt that:
a) the executions took place in the autumn of 1941
b) German executioners shooting the Polish prisoners of war
used the same method of a pistol shot in the back of the
skull that was applied in other cities such as Orel,
Voronezh, Krasnodar, and in Smolensk as well.
10) The conclusions of the expert witnesses and forensic-medical
experts that the prisoners of war—Poles were shot by the
Germans in autumn 1941 are fully confirmed by physical
evidence and documents recovered from the graves in
Katyn.
11) Shooting prisoners of war - Poles in the Katyn Forest
German fascist invaders consistently implemented their
policy of extermination of the Slavic nations.107

Even a cursory reading of the document shows a striking
similarity of “understanding” between the Burdenko Commission and
Krugłow-Merkulov findings. A more careful analysis of the final
conclusions of the Special Commission and the full text of its
communiqué confirms this conclusion. In all important aspects, the
results of the Burdenko Commission replicated the results of the
NKGB-NKVD preliminary investigation. Moreover, the communiqué
can be considered as somewhat broadened and enriched version of the
Krugłow-Merkulov Information of a Preliminary Investigation.

105. KATYN: DOCUMENTS OF A CRIME, supra note 5, at 310–14.
106. See id. at 314.
107. See id. at 315–16.
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V. Conclusion
In summary, the Burdenko Commission was not able or willing to
depart from the Krugłow-Merkulov false version of events. The
Commission only made corrections to the legend developed by
Krugłow and Merkulov where such corrections could improve the
falsified evidence. In fact, the Burdenko Commission completed its
work under the supervision and with active participation from the
NKGB-NKVD apparatus.
The Katyn lie survived in the USSR until the collapse of the
Soviet Union. It was not until April 13, 1990, when TASS disclosed
the true perpetrators of the Katyn crime—the Soviet NKVD. The
president of the Russian Federation presented documents evidencing
the responsibility of the Politburo of the VCP (b) and Joseph Stalin
for the Katyn massacre to the president of Poland in 1992. To this
day, many epigones of the Katyn lies, such as Yuri Muchin, maintain
that the Germans murdered Polish officers in the Katyn forest.108

108. See, e.g., Юрий Мухин, Антироссийская подлость (2003).
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